<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>QEMU</title><link>https://blog.ast.moe/en/tags/qemu/</link><description>Recent posts: Gorimuchu</description><generator>Hugo</generator><item><title>Cross-Checking an In-Guest eBPF Sensor Against Network Observations Outside the Guest</title><link>https://blog.ast.moe/en/blog/2026-11-18-2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:48:21 +0900</pubDate><guid>https://blog.ast.moe/en/blog/2026-11-18-2/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://blog.ast.moe/en/blog/2026-10-08-3/"&gt;An earlier article introduced Izanagi, my sandbox for isolating and observing development commands&lt;/a&gt;. In its QEMU configuration, an agent inside the Linux guest collects events with eBPF and sends them to the host. Recording the process that opened a file, a TCP connection, and even the byte range written to a socket makes it easier to investigate what a dependency or coding agent did.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But can those records still be trusted after an attacker obtains root inside the monitored guest?&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>